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Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for Change to the
Common Law Rule Admitting Evidence of a Rape
Victim's Character for Chastity.
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theo-
ries, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.
Oliver Wendell Holmes'
The evolution of criminal law and the rules of procedure and
evidence used in its enforcement provide no exception to Holmes'
perception. In accord with current assumptions and social biases the
law has punished activities earlier thought harmless; has estab-
lished safeguards once thought unnecessary; and has excluded evi-
dence long thought admissible. The process is often a slow one: it
takes time for the law to rethink policies long settled, and it takes
a longer time for it to discard them. Yet the process is a necessary
one, essential to the growth and currency of the law.
One rule of law in need of such reevaluation is the rule at common
law holding admissible in a trial for forcible rape evidence of the
prosecutrix' reputation for consensual sexual activity when a de-
fense of consent is interposed.
The law in Illinois, and in most other common law states, is well-
settled on this point.2 An accused rapist, asserting that the prosecu-
trix consented to the sex act in question, may introduce evidence of
her "bad character for chastity" as tending to show the probability
that she did so consent. 3 Many prosecutors, as well as feminist
1. O.W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2. People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 186 N.E.2d 30 (1962); People v. Stephens, 18 Ill. App.
3d 971, 310 N.E.2d 824 (1974); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
3. This evidence is limited to general evidence of her character only; evidence of specific
instances of her sexual activity with other than the accused is not admissible. People v.
Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 186 N.E.2d 30 (1962); People v. Eilers, 18 Ill. App. 3d 213, 309 N.E.2d
627 (1974).
The introduction of all such evidence is contingent on the existence of a viable question as
to the prosecutrix' consent. It is not error to exclude it if the consent defense is insubstantial,
no better than a "weak alternative defense." See People v. Cox, 383 Ill. 617, 622, 50 N.E.2d
758, 760 (1943). See also People v. Gabler, 111 Ill. App. 2d 121, 249 N.E.2d 340 (1969).
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groups, have criticized this rule, arguing that it is counter-
productive in two senses. First, it serves to dissuade reports and
prosecutions of the crime, since the rape victim is aware that her
reputation will be closely scrutinized by the court and that she will
be subject to lengthy and often embarrassing cross-examination by
defense counsel.' Second, the rule often makes impossible the con-
viction of rapists whose victims, consistent with the changed moral
standards of our time, have exercised their right to engage in pre-
marital sex.
The concern of this article is the value of and need for this rule
in today's legal system. To examine and evaluate its current use and
function, it is necessary to consider the rule's development and its
underlying bases and assumptions. Additionally, it is essential to
weigh the probative value of the evidence admitted under its aus-
pices in light of its prejudicial and inflammatory side-effects and to
discuss the rights of the accused and the constitutional implications
of any proposal for change.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RuLE: BASES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The rule evolved in a legal tradition supremely conscious of Lord
Matthew Hale's admonition that rape "is an accusation easily to be
made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party
accused, tho never so innocent" 5 and in a male-dominated society
suspicious of female motivations.'
Accordingly, generations of jurists and legal scholars, humanly
susceptible to the attitudes prevalent in a male-dominated society,
have remained stubbornly suspicious of charges of rape, especially
in cases in which the woman has escaped without serious visible
injury.7 Legal commentators' and law enforcement authorities9
4. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has held that failure by defense counsel to investigate the
character of the complainant in a rape case constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968).
5. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1736) [hereinafter cited as HALE].
6. See, e.g., WILIAM CONGREVE, THE MOURNING BRIDE (1697), in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF
WILLIM CONGREVE 361 (H. Davis ed. 1967):
"Heaven has no rage like loved turned to hatred, nor hell a fury like a woman
scorned."
7. See, e.g., Note, 62 YALE L.J. 55 (1952).
8. See, e.g., Puttkamer, Consent in Rape, 19 ILL. L. REv. 410 (1925). It is noteworthy that
this article poses as a keystone of its reasoning that rape is particularly subject to false
accusation the following analogy:
[Tihere are special inducements to make such charges, which do not apply in other
crimes. Thus a man's automobile may be stolen. He is ordinarily under no induce-
ment to hide the fact of a theft or to accuse an innocent person. If, on reasonable
suspicion he has made an accusation, he will generally have no ground to desire a
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alike, insisting that many rape reports are contrived by malicious
or hysterical women, have established stringent procedures by
which a false accuser can be unmasked. 0 English courts since the
time of Lord Hale have been urged to be wary of false accusations:
I only mention these instances [of false accusation], that we may
be the more cautious upon trials of offenses of this nature, wherein
the court and jury may with so much ease be imposed upon with-
out great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the offense many
times transporting the judge and jury with so much indignation,
that they are over-hastily car'ried to the conviction of the person
accused thereof by the confident testimony, sometimes of mali-
cious and false witnesses."
conviction, should it appear that the defendant is innocent. His reputation will not
suffer if the jury is not convinced of the defendant's guilt or concludes that the
defendant honestly believed he had the prosecutor's consent. In a rape charge all
these considerations are reversed. If the commission of a sexual act becomes known,
the prosecutrix is impelled by many motives of self-interest to assert that it was
done criminally. If thereafter a man is put on trial she has every selfish inducement
to bring about his conviction, as every ground of acquittal except possibly mistaken
identity would involve a reflection on her. In short, point for point, the conclusion
is the direct opposite of that just reached in the case of the stolen automobile.
Id. at 421-22. What Puttkamer failed or refused to note, however, is that the parallel he
establishes is inaccurate, even assuming its psychological underpinnings are correct, The
automobile has been stolen in his hypothetical; the woman has not been raped. Making
perfect his analogy, let us assume that the auto was not stolen: in a fit of drunken generosity,
Puttkamer's hypothetical man has given his car to a barroom acquaintance. May he not also
be "impelled by many motives of self-interest to assert that the act wae done criminally"?
9. Police reports are filled with suspicions about rape from police literature.
Chapters on rape investigations are always preceded by a cautioning to suspect the
victim of falsehoods. No other offense has this suspicion-based prejudicing of the
officer's objectivity.
Testimony of Greg Conner, a police training officer at the University of Illinois. Transcript
of the Hearing of the Illinois House of Representatives Rape Study Committee in Downers
Grove, Illinois, February 9, 1974 at 108. [hereinafter cited as Rape Study Hearing]. (A copy
of the pertinent portions of this transcript is on file with the Loyola University of Chicago
Law Journal Office.)
10. Police operations are again reversed in dealing with the victims of rape.
Interview is exchanged for interrogation. The woman can be raped twice, by the
offender and later by the police, psychologically. Lie detector tests are structured
into police policy and procedures to weed out falsehoods and to further increased
suspicion and increased rationalization. I think that, in two cases I know of specifi-
cally, in the counties, in Peoria County and in Champaign County, women before
their report is accepted, must submit to a polygraph test.
Id.
11. HmA , supra note 5, at 636. Both this passage and that quoted in the text accompany-
ing note 4 supra, arose in the context of Lord Hale's consideration of whether "a child under
twelve years old . . . may be admitted to give evidence .. " id. at 634. Consistent misap-
plication of these passages has, however, effectively expanded their usage to the nature of all
rape charges and the credibility of all complainants in rape cases. See, e.g., Mills v. U.S.,
164 U.S. 644 (1897).
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In order to guard against this perceived likelihood of unjust con-
victions, English courts, thinking to show the probability of the
prosecutrix' consent, have long held that "evidence that the woman
had a bad character previous to the supposed commission of the
offense is admissible."'" While evidence of specific instances of the
prosecutrix' previous sexual experience was admitted in a few early
cases, the courts eventually came to admit only general evidence of
the woman's character for chastity. 3 The reasoning underlying this
limitation was that the prosecutrix should not be forced to defend
her reputation against myriad specific allegations of misconduct
and that the encouragement of such sideshows would introduce too
many collateral issues, detracting from the trial itself.'4 This permit-
ted the prosecutrix to deny accusations of any particular instances
of sexual activity with other than the accused on cross-examination;
this denial would remain unrebutted as to such specific acts.'5 Evi-
dence of her bad character for chastity, however, will always be
allowed if the defendant has put forth as a credible defense an
allegation of her consent.'"
The rule developed almost simultaneously in the American
courts. An 1838 New York case expounded it with gusto:
[A]re we to be told that previous prostitution shall not raise...
a doubt of assent? [T]hat the triers should be advised to make
no distinction between a virgin and a tenant of the stew? Between
one who would prefer death to pollution, and another who, incited
by lust and lucre, daily offers her person to the indiscriminate
embraces of the other sex?"
That case proceeded to deplore and reject the emerging English rule
prohibiting the introduction of evidence of specific instances of the
prosecutrix' sexual activity. Most American jurisdictions, however,
chose not to depart from the English movement and permitted the
introduction of general evidence of the prosecutrix' moral character
only.'8
12. Rex v. Clarke, 2 Stark. 241, 244, 171 Eng. Rep. 633, 634 (K.B. 1817); cf. Rex v. Barker,
3 Car. & P. 588, 172 Eng. Rep. 558 (K.B. 1829): "[G]eneral evidence might be given of her
being a street walker."
13. Rex v. Martin, 6 Car. & P. 562, 172 Eng. Rep. 1365 (K.B. 1834); Regina v. Robins, 2
M. & Rob. 513, 174 Eng. Rep. 366 (Q.B. 1843); Regina v. Gibbon, Le. & Ca. 109, 169 Eng.
Rep. 1324 (Q.B. 1861).
14. Regina v. Ryan, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 115 (Q.B. 1846).
15. Queen v. Riley, 18 Q.B.D. 481 (1887).
16. 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND §826 & n. (e) (3rd ed. 1955).
17. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. Rep. 192, 195 (N.Y. 1838).
18. 2 WIGMORE §200 (Supp. 1974).
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The earliest Illinois Supreme Court case addressing the question
announced without hesitation its intent to follow in the common law
tradition:
It is the general rule that the character of the prosecutrix may be
impeached, but this must be done by means of general evidence
of her reputation in that respect, and not by evidence of particular
instances of unchastity.",
Illinois law has remained singularly constant on this point, as has
the law of nearly all common law jurisdictions. 0 Because the law is
so well-settled and little subject to criticism, few cases concerning
only the admissibility of such evidence have been heard by the
Illinois appellate courts in recent times.'
A REEVALUATION
Changing social awareness compels a reexamination of many
long-accepted practices and a careful analysis of the premises upon
which the law is established. The rule in question developed during
an era in which both society and the law zealously protected women;
when the rape of a "coy and modest female, severely chaste and
instinctively shuddering at the thought of impurity"2 was thought
to draw outrage from paternally trained male jurors and jurists.
Lord Hale may consequently have cautioned well against this condi-
tioned outrage and the resulting reactionary conviction of an ac-
cused. Similarly, legal scholars may well have feared that the bur-
den of proof traditional to our system-that the defendant go free
if any reasonable doubt remained as to his guilt-was upset in a
trial for rape, where the natural sympathies of the judge and jury
were thought to revolt against the accused. 3
Yet as protective of the idealized "coy and modest female" as
society was, so was it quick to condemn unseemly sexual activity by
females. It was loathe to afford such women a forum to air what it
feared to be often contrived or falsified charges of rape, charges
which might well result in the accused's conviction and the imposi-
tion of extremely harsh punishments.2 4 Accordingly, nearly all juris-
19. Sherwin v. People, 69 ll. 55, 59 (1873).
20. 2 WIGMORE §§62, 200 (Supp. 1974).
21. Those cases which have arisen in recent years have gone only to specific applications
of the rule and peculiar fact situations. See, e.g., People v. Fryman, 4 Ill. 2d 224, 122 N.E.2d
573 (1954), in which a character witness, though testifying that the prosecutrix' character for
chastity was bad, later admitted that he did not know what "chastity" meant.
22. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. Rep. 192, 196 (N.Y. 1838).
23. Note, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 458, 460; see also Mills v. U.S., 164 U.S. 644 (1897).
24. See, e.g., HALE, supra note 5, at 627.
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dictions permitted the accused to claim that the prosecutrix con-
sented to the act and to support this claim by showing that it was
her custom to so assent." Thus the courts began to permit the intro-
duction of such evidence, reasoning, for example,
no court can overrule the law of human nature, which declares that
one who has already started on the road to prostitution would be
less reluctant to pursue her way, than another who yet remains at
her home of innocence .... 20
The Illinois Supreme Court clearly stated the theory upon which
the rule evolved:
The admissibility of all this class of evidence is placed upon the
ground that an unchaste woman would be more likely to consent
to the act than a virtuous one, and therefore her previous connec-
tion with the accused, or her general reputation for want of chast-
ity, are proper ingredients in determining the question of whether
the particular act in controversy was accomplished solely by force
or with her virtual consent."
In sum, the courts have permitted the introduction of such evi-
dence simply because they felt it was essential to the defense of the
falsely accused and probative of the matter in issue. "[I]t is more
probable that an unchaste woman assented to such an act than a
virtuous woman. '2 Little or no consideration, however, was given
to the probative value of the evidence as against its prejudicial and
inflammatory side effects, both within the immediate context of the
trial and within the greater framework of society and the criminal
justice system. 29 It is this failure which may make especially profita-
ble a reevaluation of the rule, particularly in light of the social,
sexual and political realities of modern American society.
There appears to be little argument that evidence of a woman's
character for consensual sexual activity may have some tendency,
however slight, to show the likelihood of her consent to a later sex
act ° However, the countervailing question for the jurist and law-
25. 1 WIGMORE, §§62, 200.
26. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. Rep. 192, 196 (N.Y. 1838).
27. Sherwin v. People, 69 Ill. 55, 59 (1873).
28. People v. Allen, 289 111. 218, 228, 124 N.E. 329, 330 (1919).
29. The failure to balance the probative value and need against the harmful results of
admission of the evidence has been carried over into the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although
FED. R. EVID. 403 provides for the exclusion of evidence determined to be prejudicial, confus-
ing, or a waste of time, FED. R. EVID. 404 holds admissible without such balancing
"[elvidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of a crime .. "
30. There is, however, a growing dissatisfaction with this conclusion. One article proposes
the following logically parallel cross-examination of the victim of a robbery:
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maker must be whether that tendency is sufficiently strong to jus-
tify the introduction of evidence which will not only severely endan-
ger the likelihood of obtaining a rational verdict based on the total-
ity of the evidence, but also dissuade many reports of, and prosecu-
tions for, rape by exposing the reputations and private lives of per-
sons already subjected to severe trauma to the unfeeling scrutiny of
the courtroom.
The principle at issue was clearly stated by Lord Chief Justice
Coleridge in 1887:
It has been held that evidence to shew that the woman has
previously had connection with persons other than the accused,
when she has denied that fact, must be rejected, and there are very
good reasons for rejecting it. It should in my view be rejected, not
only upon the ground that to admit it would be unfair and a hard-
ship to the woman, but also upon the general principle that it is
not evidence which goes directly to the point in issue at the trial.
The question in issue being whether or not a criminal attempt has
been made upon her by A., evidence that she previously had
connection with B. and C. is obviously not in point. It is obvious,
too, that the result of admitting such evidence would be to deprive
an unchaste woman of any protection. .. 3'
This dicta by the Lord Chief Justice was undermined and limited,
however, by a statement in a concurring opinion that the holding
did not impair "the right of the prisoner, on an indictment for rape
or attempt to ravish, to give evidence that the woman was a com-
mon prostitute. ' ' 32 It consequently had little perceptible impact on
the development of the law, but rather. stood as a mere restatement
of the policy against admission of specific instances of the prosecu-
trix' previous consensual sexual activity. The broader concern
raised by Lord Coleridge, however, has yet to be satisfactorily ad-
dressed. The point at issue in a trial for rape is not whether the
prosecutrix has "had connection" with B. or C., nor whether she has
".. . Have you ever been held up before?"
"No."
"Have you ever given money away?"
"Yes, of course."
"And you did so willingly?"
"What are you getting at?"
"Well, let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in the past. In
fact, you have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure you weren't
contriving to have your money taken . . .
The Legal Bias Against Rape Victims, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (April 1975).
31. Queen v. Riley, 18 Q.B.D. 481, 483-84 (1887).
32. Id. at 485 (Stephan, J., concurring).
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a reputation for such activity; it is whether the accused raped her.
If the defendant asserts that she consented to the act, the issue then
becomes whether she did so consent, but to that act only. Evidence
of her reputation for consensual sexual activity with others may cast
some light on the probability that she consented as alleged by the
accused, but it cannot be deemed conclusive, or even highly
persuasive.
While a woman who has chosen to engage in premarital or extra-
marital sexual activity with one or more partners may be marginally
more likely to consent to additional sexual affairs, it is not at all
certain, especially in today's society, that she is so disposed as to
be indiscriminate in her choice of sex partners. Since recent studies
have documented a marked increase in premarital sex,33 the likeli-
hood that an unmarried rape victim will have engaged in sexual
activity is substantially greater than in previous times. Therefore
the probability that she will have a reputation for such conduct is
also greater. Yet while these studies demonstrate no significant
trend to indiscriminate sexual intercourse, 34 the introduction of evi-
dence of the prosecutrix' character for sexual activity may lead the
jury to infer such indsicriminate sex. Indeed, even in cases in which
consent is a questionable defense, the admission of such evidence
has led juries to acquit on preconceived notions of contributory fault
and a general hesitancy to convict for the rape of a person whom
some jurors seem to consider "fair game. '35
These prejudicial counterfactors have been well documented. The
University of Chicago's American Jury Project found a distinctive,
if not surprising, pattern in jury verdicts in trials for forcible rape.3 6
33. One study demonstrated that 65 percent of the unmarried female sample had engaged
in intercourse at some time. Over 80 percent of that segment, however, had had intercourse
with three or fewer partners. Oswalt, Sexual and Contraceptive Behavior of College Females,
22 AM. COL. HEALTH ASS'N. J. 392 (1974).
A recent full-length book on the subject, while demonstrating an increase in premarital sex
throughout the country, documents no significant tendency to indiscriminate sexual inter-
course. M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's (1974).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., H. KALvEN, and H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 70 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as KALVEN] and text accompanying notes 35 through 42 infra. For a limited legal reflection
of this view, see the MODEL PENAL CODE §213.6 (4) (Prop. off. draft, 1962), proposing that
defendants in statutory rape cases be given an absolute defense if it is shown that the victim
was "sexually promiscuous," and failing to address the real issue at that stage: whether or
not there was consent. See also note 42 infra.
36. KALVEN, supra note 35, at 70.
It should be noted, of course, that the Jury Project does not isolate the effects of the
introduction of character evidence only. The verdict pattern in rape cases may be substan-
tially influenced not only by the introduction of character evidence, but also by jury hesitancy
to impose stiff sentences for this crime and other similar factors.
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In the forty-two trials studied in which consent was likely to consti-
tute a viable defense-trials in which there was neither extrinsic
violence, multiple attackers, nor attack by a complete stranger-the
jury returned guilty verdicts in only three instances. The trial judges
reported they would have convicted in twenty-one of these same
cases. 37 In no other crime was this disparity in the verdict pattern
so emphatic. The jury appears to redefine the crime of rape and
adjusts its verdict to take into consideration what it feels is con-
tributory fault on the part of the victim. 38 This jury determination
of fault is not limited to what might be termed provocative behavior
on the part of the prosecutrix, but extends to previous bad charac-
ter .3 One of the verdicts reported to the Project clearly illustrates
this factor:
In another case the jury's reaction is equally disturbing. Again
the rape appears to have been brutal. Three men kidnap a girl from
the street at 1:30 in the morning, take her to an apartment, and
attack her. The judge states:
"It developed that the young unmarried girl had two
illegitimate children; also defendant claimed she was a pros-
titute."
He calls the verdict [not guilty] a "travesty of justice."'
The Jury Project documents another related area of jury
hesitancy to convict. In prosecutions for violations of laws which the
community considers to be ill-advised or which are otherwise
unpopular, juries produce substantially lower rates of conviction.'
In a society which produces some jurors who wonder whether rape,
especially of a promiscuous woman, should be a crime at all,43 there
can be little question that introduction of a prosecutrix' previous
sexual reputation can make successful prosecution and rational dis-
position of rape cases impossible.
37. Id. at 253.
38. Where a young defendant is charged with raping a seventeen-year-old girl
and the jury acquits, the judge explains bluntly:
"A group of young people on a beer drinking party. The jury probably
figured the girl asked for what she got."
Id. at 249-50.
39. Id. at 254.
40. Id. at 251.
41. Id. at 286-93.
42. See, e.g., an interview with a juror: "[T]he guy's not trying to kill her. He's just
trying to give her a good time." N. Blitman and R. Green, Inez Garcia on Trial, Ms., May,
1975, 49 at 86.
43. 1 WIGMORE § 63; 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery §43 (1975); cf Cannon v. People, 141
Ill. 270, 30 N.E. 1027 (1892).
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Self-Defense: An Analogy?
A similar problem may be thought to arise under a rule sometimes
considered to be parallel to that under consideration: the introduc-
tion in a trial for homicide of evidence to show the victim's character
for violence. Generally, such evidence may be introduced when a
viable issue develops as to whether the deceased was in fact the
aggressor. Evidence of the victim's character for violence or "turbu-
lence" is admissible to show the probability of the deceased's ac-
tion.43 Professor Wigmore, however, is uncomfortable with this rule,
and explicitly cautions against the indiscriminate use and introduc-
tion of such evidence:
There ought, of course, to be some other appreciable evidence of
the deceased's aggression, for the character-evidence can hardly be
of value unless there is otherwise a fair possibility of doubt on the
point; moreover, otherwise the deceased's bad character is likely
to be put forward and serve improperly as a mere excuse for the
killing, under the pretext of evidencing his aggression, and it is
often feasible to obtain untrustworthy character testimony for that
purpose .41
There are several factors worth noting, not only in Wigmore's
description of and caveat to the rule, but also as to the suitability
of its parallel with the principal rule in question. Professor Wigmore
accepts the evidence of a homicide victim's character for violence
as offering some probative value once a "fair possibility of doubt"
is established on the point. This language indicates a demand for a
foundation, a primary corroboration before allowing the introduc-
tion of matter concerning reputation. 5 He is keenly suspicious of
abuse of the evidence, and proposes that it be carefully used, else
the defendant be improperly acquitted by a jury which may feel that
the killing of such an evil character should not be punished. He
further cautions that it is possible to obtain untrustworthy and
falsified evidence and that such possibility be kept in mind by the
judge. No like concern, however, is shown in his treatment of the
rule in consent defense rape trials. As in the cases themselves, Pro-
fessor Wigmore ignores the danger of the improper use and introduc-
tion of evidence of a woman's previous bad character for chastity.
44. 1 WIGMORE § 63, at 469-70.
45. The nature of this foundation, however, has been only obscurely defined by the courts.
In Illinois the testimony of the defendant alone seems to have been determined sufficient
foundation for the introduction of the evidence. People v. Gibson, 385 II1. 371, 378, 52 N.E.2d
1008, 1011 (1944).
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He disregards the prejudicial side effects of such introduction. 4" Yet,
as the Jury Project demonstrates, the introduction of evidence of
prosecutrix' character results in substantial prejudice to the con-
duct of a rational trial. 7 Moreover, evidence of a deceased's reputa-
tion generates none of the detrimental extrajudicial side effects pro-
duced by reputation evidence in a trial for rape. Clearly the possibil-
ity of the introduction of the deceased's bad character is likely to
result in no marked disincentive to reports and prosecutions of the
crime similar to that resulting in rape cases. 8
It is also clear that the parallel itself is subject to serious question.
Evidence concerning the violent character of the deceased in a hom-
icide case may be indispensible to and irreplaceable in the accused's
defense when there are no credible eyewitnesses. 9 Evidence of the
prosecutrix' promiscuous character in a rape case is not so essential:
in the former, the deceased is, of course, not available for cross-
examination and impeachment at trial. 0 The prosecutrix' availabil-
ity for cross-examination renders the major policy concerns behind
the introduction of character evidence in the homicide trial inap-
plicable to a trial for rape: the judge and jury will be able to evaluate
46. 1 WIGMORE § 63.
47. For further discussion see text accompanying notes 35 through 42 supra.
48. That such a disincentive exists in rape cases cannot be seriously contested. The
Illinois House of Representatives Rape Study Committee concluded that "[Olne of the
major problems concerning the crime of rape is the low incidence of reporting of this crime
(estimated at 10% of total rapes committed)." It determined that this low report rate resulted
chiefly from the victim's reluctance to "suffer further personal embarrassment and social
stigma" and fear of "certain unpleasant court procedures permitted the offender in his de-
fense .. " REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE 78TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, at 42. December, 1974.
This disincentive was remarkably demonstrated by a police training officer in his testimony
before that Committee. A portion of his police training course concerns police procedure in
rape cases.
I end my discussion of rape investigation with the question that if the officers had
their wives, or if their wives had been raped, would they report it to the police? Over
fifty percent say, no, they wouldn't.
Testimony of Greg Conner, a police training officer at the University of Illinois. Rape Study
Hearing, supra note 9, at 108.
49. It is interesting to note, however, that not only have the Illinois courts begun to look
with suspicion on the introduction of this evidence, see, e.g., People v. Gill, 7 Ill. App. 3d 24,
286 N.E.2d 516 (1972), but have in one case limited it to evidence of the victim's prior violent
acts toward the accused only. People v. Peeler, 12 Ill. App. 3d 940, 299 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
50. Professor Wigmore apparently confines the rule concerning introduction of evidence
of a victim's character for violence to those cases in which the victim is deceased, and cannot
be present at trial. A few jurisdictions have extended the admissibility of such evidence to
trials for assault, when a material issue is raised as to which party was the aggressor. 1
WIGMORE § 63. Although both 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery §43 and an annotation at 1
A.L.R. 3d 571 (1965) flatly state this to be the rule, those references cite cases from far fewer
than a majority of the jurisdictions.
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her demeanor and credibility. The parallel is inaccurate. The policy
concerns of these rules are not identical, and since no common need
for the evidence is established, they cannot be said to be analogous.
The rules merely admit similar evidence in dissimilar situations.
This recognition, together with the realization that the prejudicial
effects in a rape trial are at least as great as in a homicide case5' and
that the extrajudicial counter effects are substantially more damn-
ing,52 necessarily dictates a change in the rule. 3
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
It is necessary to consider the constitutional dimensions of any
proposal which limits the content of an accused's defense or which
constricts the scope of his cross-examination. Two specific constitu-
tional 4 concerns are raised: the accused's fourteenth amendment
right to due process55 and his sixth amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him.5"
Due Process
The United States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi
defined the right of due process to be "in essence, the right to a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."57 It recog-
nized, however, that this right is not without limit:
[T]he accused, as is required of the State, must comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and inno-
cence.
5 8
51. See text accompanying notes 35 through 42 supra.
52. For further discussion see note 48 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 35 through 42 supra. See also, with regard to evidence
of a defendant's character, but with language and logic sufficiently general to cast light on
the topic in question, Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948):
The inquiry [into defendant's character] is not rejected because character is irrele-
vant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overper-
suade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record. . . .The overriding policy
of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical
experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise
and undue prejudice.
54. The following discussion focuses on cases arising under the federal constitution. The
Illinois Constitution, in art. I. §§ 2, 8 (1970), contains identical protection in substantially
the same language.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "... nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
56. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
57. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
58. Id. at 302.
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In Chambers, the Court decided that a trial court's failure to
provide the defendant an exception to the hearsay rule, and thereby
excluding evidence "critical" to his defense, together with its refusal
to permit him to cross-examine a witness who had testified ad-
versely, "denied him a trial in accord with traditional and funda-
mental standards of due process."59
The Court, however, took care to examine the competing interests
asserted, and reached its decision only after finding that the balance
of those interests tipped greatly in favor of the defendant." It deter-
mined that not only was the evidence excluded "critical to Cham-
ber's defense," but "under the facts and circumstances of this case,"
the rational state interests asserted were not defeated by the admis-
sion of such evidence." Mississippi had asserted two interests in the
exclusion: its longstanding "voucher" rule, and the rule against
admission of hearsay. The Supreme Court found the "voucher" rule
to be a "remnant of primitive English trial practice. . . . bear[ing]
little present relationship to the realities of the criminal process."
The Court then evaluated the lower courts' refusal to extend an
established exception to the hearsay rule-that admitting declara-
tions against pecuniary interest-to the circumstances of the
Chambers case. The Court found that this refusal was not necessary
to protect the State's interest in excluding perjured and unreliable
testimony:
The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive
assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic
rationale of the exception for declarations against interest. . .. In
these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting
the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not
be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 13
The Court, however, cautioned against overbroad interpretation of
its holding:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of consti-
tutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the
respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and proce-
dures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and cir-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 303.
62. Id. at 296.
63. Id. at 302.
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cumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived
Chambers of a fair trial.6'
Relying on this caveat, circuit courts facing similar questions
after the decision in Chambers have not followed that case, but,
instead, have distinguished it as based upon exceptional facts. 5 All
have properly deemed it necessary to examine and balance the in-
terests asserted. However, absent the lopsided balance present in
Chambers, they have found no deprivation of due process."
The Illinois courts have likewise examined and rejected conten-
tions that state evidentiary and procedural exclusions have violated
due process under the Chambers holding:
The relevancy and reliability of the proferred evidence are vital
factors and must be considered before finding that the evidence
was improvidently excluded under the Chambers rule. Therefore
when this rationale and the precept that the integrity of the truth-
finding function of the trial must be protected are applied to the
case at bar, it appears that the trial court's rulings were proper. 7
There is clearly no constitutional requirement that the defendant
be permitted to make his case in any and every manner possible.
His absolute right to introduce evidence extends only so far as such
evidence reliably tends to demonstrate his innocence without irre-
versibly interfering with the rational conduct of the trial. When his
proferred evidence threatens to violate the substantial state inter-
ests in the rational and fair conduct of trial, a balance must be
struck. Chambers, and the cases decided after it, hold only that
such evidence must be admitted when the balance is tilted defini-
tively in favor of the defendant: when it is clear that the rejected
evidence is crucial to the accused's rational defense and that the
State can demonstrate no substantial and rational interest requiring
its exclusion.
This article concerns a proposed evidentiary exclusion that pre-
sents no such skewed balance. Evidence of a prosecutrix' reputation
for chastity is only marginally reliable and extremely damaging to
fair trial conduct. 8 It is, additionally, not essential to an accused's
64. Id. at 302-03.
65. See, e.g., U.S. v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124,
1155 (7th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1973).
66. Id.
67. People v. Hanks, 17 Ill. App. 3d 633, 639, 307 N.E.2d 638, 644 (1974). See also People
v. Gant, 58 Ill. 2d 178, 317 N.E.2d 564 (1974); People v. Craven, 54 Ill. 2d 419, 299 N.E.2d 1
(1973).
68. See notes 35 through 42 supra and accompanying text.
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rational defense. Even if evidence of a woman's bad character for
chastity is ruled inadmissible, the accused still has available cross-
examination and impeachment to cast doubt on the prosecutrix'
claimed lack of consent, and to show a possibility for bias by reveal-
ing a previous relationship with the accused. Evidence may be intro-
duced to impeach the prosecutrix by showing her bad character for
truth and veracity. Her testimony may be attacked as being not
"clear and convincing.""9 Other evidence may be adduced to show
motive for false accusation. The woman so deeply feared by the
common law, she who maliciously constructs a tale of rape to perse-
cute an unfaithful suitor, to avenge some real or imagined wrong,
or for some reason of mental imbalance, 0 will likely be impeached
or exposed in this manner.7 The jury will be able to observe her
demeanor and comportment and will give weight to her testimony
accordingly.
Indeed, any perceived due process objection appears to be
grounded more in history than in the Constitution. The Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 404 recognizes that the
basis for the rule "lies more in history and experience than in logic"
but urges that "an underlying justification can fairly be found in
terms of the relative presence and absence of prejudice in the var-
ious situations."" Uneasy with this "justification," the Advisory
Committee extended its apologia:
In any event, the criminal rule is so deeply imbedded in our
jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions and
to override doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence.73
This justification once again fails to address the question as to the
rule admitting evidence of a prosecutrix' character. That question,
from a constitutional due process perspective, must be whether the
evidence is substantially helpful to the accused's defense on the
merits, without destroying the rational forum necessary to the ad-
ministration of justice.
69. If her testimony is not clear and convincing, the conviction cannot stand unless it is
otherwise supported by corroborative evidence. People v. White, 26 Ill. 2d 199, 186 N.E.2d
351 (1962); People v. Porter 13 IIl. App. 3d 893, 300 N.E.2d 814 (1973).
70. 3A WIGMORE §924(a).
71. Even in the psychological case studies cited by Wigmore in support of his proposition
that some women are pathological liars and tend to vent their maladjustment in false accusa-
tions of sexual misconduct, he notes that they have a bad reputation for veracity as well, id.
at 741-44. Properly, therefore, it would be evidence, if any, of her poor reputation for veracity,
not evidence of sexual misconduct, which belongs in the balance of the jury's decision.
72. FED. R. EVID. 404, Advisory Committee Comment.
73. Id.
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A law providing for the exclusion of evidence of a prosecutrix'
reputation for consensual sexual activity presents little difficulty
under the Chambers holding. The evidence excluded by such a law
is demonstrably of dubious probative value and leads to grossly
unbalanced verdicts.
Confrontation
The sixth amendment provides an accused the right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him. The policy behind this pro-
vision is, according to Wigmore, two-faceted:
(1) The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure
for the opponent the opportunity for cross-examination ...
(2) There is . . . a secondary advantage to be obtained by the
personal appearance of the witness; the judge and jury are enabled
to obtain the elusive and uncommunicable evidence of a witness'
deportment while testifying. .... 7.
The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed this position:
"cross-examination is the principal means by which the believabil-
ity of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested."75 Only a
few cases speak specifically to the effect of a limitation placed upon
the scope of cross-examination or impeachment." In Davis v.
Alaska, the Court addressed itself specifically to this constitutional
issue and held that such a limitation on the scope of cross-
examination and impeachment can be violative of the confrontation
clause.77 Before so holding, however, the Court as it had in
Chambers carefully balanced the asserted state interest against the
value and nature of the evidence excluded.78 At trial, the defense
counsel had attempted to show a key witness' bias by revealing the
witness' juvenile record. The judge prohibited the introduction of
74. 5 WIGMORE § 1395 (Chad. rev. 1974).
75. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1973).
76. The bulk of litigation on the clause has concerned the introduction at trial of written
depositions, transcripts of prior sworn testimony, or certain hearsay evidence. See, e.g.,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In such cases, the Court has invariably found that
absent a showing that the testimony or evidence in question was secured only upon adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, its introduction will unconstitutionally deprive the defen-
dant of his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965); cf. Pointer v. Texas 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965):
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been
more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confron-
tation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the
kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.
77. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1973).
78. Id. at 315-20.
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such evidence, asserting the state interest in preserving the ano-
nymity of juvenile records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
simply that "[i]n this setting we conclude that the right of confron-
tation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile
offender." 9
The Court examined the evidence excluded and found that it was
essential and rationally helpful to the defendant's case. Only upon
this examination and finding, and only after deprecating the state
interest asserted-the "temporary embarrassment" of the wit-
ness-did the majority of the Court declare the error to be of consti-
tutional magnitude requiring reversal. 0
A decision as to the constitutionality of a limitation on the scope
of defense counsel's cross-examination and impeachment, therefore,
will again require a balance between the accused's right to make his
defense and the asserted state interest. If a defendant is prohibited
from presenting evidence "critical" to his defense"' or from ration-
ally attacking "key elements" of the state's case,12 serious constitu-
tional questions will be raised, and will not likely be overcome ab-
sent a showing of a substantial state interest in the exclusion. As
has been earlier noted, however, the exclusionary rule proposed by
this article presents little danger of failing this balancing test: the
evidence to be excluded is neither crucial nor rational, and the state
interest in its exclusion is indeed substantial. 3
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The law's traditional distrust of the jury in rape cases and its fear
79. Id. at 319.
80. Id. at 315-18.
81. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
82. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1973).
83. See text accompanying notes 35 through 42 supra. See also People v. Hanks, 17 Ill.
App. 3d 633, 638, 307 N.E.2d 638, 643 (1974):
Witnesses in criminal proceedings are reluctant to testify and many times for good
reason. . . . Recognition should be given to their rights, their fears, their time and
inconvenience, their public harassment or ridicule; and to this end the courts
should guard and protect them when possible, especially when by so doing the aim
is to assure both society and the defendant a fair trial. The courts must ever be alert
to the injection of extraneous and prejudicial issues into the trial under the guise
of due process or fair trial and never condone this as sound or accepted defense
tactics. The statement of Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court may be
appropriate under the circumstances: "There has been an increasing tendency in
criminal cases to try some person other than the defendant, and some issue other
than his guilt." (People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti (1971), 50 1ll.2d 51, 55, 277 N.E.2d
705, 707, cert. denied, Hanrahan v. Sears, 406 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 1778, 32 L.Ed. 2d
121.) We might add that this results in something other than a search for truth.
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of reactionary, hasty, and unjust convictions" has not been proven
out in modem practice. According to the American Jury Project, an
accused rapist stands a 50 percent better chance of acquittal than
the average criminal defendant. 5 While the basic pattern in all
criminal cases is that a jury will acquit in 30 percent and a judge
aquit in 17 percent, in rape cases a jury will acquit in over 43 percent
and a judge in 29 percent. Yet these cases have already gone
through a process designed to discover false accusations and reject
weak cases. This preliminary screening is much more stringent than
that involved in any other crime.' Between 1588 and 5089 percent of
all reported rapes are judged by police to be "unfounded" and are
not further pursued. Prosecutors are known to pursue only those
rape cases which appear to present an especially strong possibility
of conviction."9 It is in these strongest cases that juries and judges
alike acquit in such markedly higher percentages. There is little
evidence that either the judge or the jury is likely to leap to the
rigorous and unthinking defense of the prosecutrix at the expense
of the falsely accused. Neither the judge nor the jury has abandoned
the presumption of the defendants' innocence in rape trials. They
can therefore be relied upon to refrain from Lord Hale's imagined
righteous and wrathful convictions, to observe the prosecutrix care-
fully, to attend to the cross examination, and to convict the accused
only when proper: when the state has proven his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In recognition of the foregoing, and of the problems arising from
the introduction of evidence of a prosecutrix' previous character for
chastity, several states have begun to reconsider the rule." Statutes
84. See text accompanying notes 5 through 11 supra.
85. KALVEN, supra note 35, at 33 and 70.
86. Id. at 70.
87. As to police screening, see, e.g., note 10 supra. See also the testimony of Ronald A.
Johnson, the Chief of the Bolingbrook Police Department:
The problem we have in rape is the State's Attorney's Office. Because they have
an overburden of cases, they enter what they call "plea bargaining." First off, they
want to know all the facts and the background of the victim. They want to know if
she is divorced, single, fools around, where the rape takes place, did she go with
the guy to a bar, and some of these elements are in the cases. And the State's
Attorneys will say, "Well, let's change the case to assault and battery" or whatever
the case is.
Rape Study Hearing, supra note 9, at 20.
88. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 14 (1972).
89. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPAcTr-AN ASSESSMENT, 25 (1967).
90. Id. at 25. See also note 87 supra.
91. Revolt against Rape, TIME, October 13, 1975, at 48.
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substantially prohibiting the introduction of such evidence have
been enacted into law in California" and Michigan.13 The 1974 Cali-
fornia Robbins Rape Evidence Law provides that in a trial for rape,
evidence of the prosecutrix' previous sexual character, reputation,
or conduct with other than the accused is absolutely prohibited
when used to show consent.9 The accused may introduce evidence
of the prosecutrix' character or reputation for chastity only to rebut
such evidence previously introduced by the prosecution .1
Evidence of previous sexual conduct used to attack credibility
may be admitted only after a written motion and offer of proof is
made by the defendant, and this proof is tested outside the presence
of the jury by questioning the complaining witness. Only if the trial
judge determines the offered evidence probative and not unduly
prejudicial may it be introduced. 6
The Michigan statute, part of a 1975 omnibus rape law reform
act, provides a different approach. 7 The general rule there estab-
lished, that no evidence of the prosecutrix' sexual conduct may be
admitted, is excepted only after an in camera hearing preceded by
a written defense motion. A judicial finding that the proposed
evidence is "material to the fact at issue in the case and that its
inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value" is required before evidence of the prosecutrix' previous con-
duct with the accused or evidence of specific acts to show the source
of semen, pregnancy or disease may be introduced.9
The noteworthy difference between these laws is their respective
method of dealing with evidence of the prosecutrix' prior sexual
activity with the accused. The Michigan law explicitly requires a
finding that such proposed evidence is more probative than prejudi-
cial.' °° The California law is silent on the point, apparently leaving
in effect existing common law on the subject. Such evidence is not,
therefore, likely subject to such a balancing test. On the other hand,
the Michigan law is silent as to the use of such evidence for im-
peachment, while the California law outlaws the use of such evi-
92. CAL. EVID. CODE, (West Supp. 1975), §§ 782, 1103; CAL. PENAL CODE (West Supp.
1975), §§ 1127e, 1127d (1975).
93. MicH. CoMp. LAWS § 520j (Supp. 1975).
94. CAL. EVID. CODE, § 1103 (2)(a) (West Supp. 1975).
95. Id. § 1103 (2)(c).
96. Id. § 782 (a).
97. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 520j (Supp. 1975).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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dence except upon a finding as to its value.'"' Despite these differ-
ences, the major effect and intent of the two statutes are the same;
the policy decision has been made that it is
• ..consistent with adjudication on the merits of each case to
disallow evidence of prior consensual sexual relations of the plain-
tiff [sic] with persons other than the defendant. It seems quite
evident that women who have active sex lives deserve as full pro-
tection of the law [as] 'chaste' women. The act of rape is as wrong
against a prostitute as a virgin. The key to the prosecution should
be the facts of the alleged incident, not the sexual habits of the
complainant. In cases of sexual assault, the assault itself should
be the focus, not the act of sex; evidence of assault in the particular
instance should not be made suspect just because of prior sexual
activity by the plaintiff [sic].' 0
The Illinois General Assembly is currently considering two pro-
posals for change in the present rule.' 3 One, House Bill 382,104 as
amended, prohibits the introduction of all evidence of the prosecu-
trix' previous sexual conduct with other than the accused, unless an
offer of proof is made. The trial judge may allow introduction of
such evidence only after determining "the relevancy and, therefore,
the admissibility of such evidence."'0 5
101. CAL. EVID. CODE, § 782 (a) (West Supp. 1975).
102. MEMORANDUM TO GOVERNOR WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, MAY 1, 1974, FROM THE OFFICE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.
103. HOUSE BILLS 274 and 382, 79th GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS (1975). Both
bills have passed the House of Representatives by substantial margins and await action in
the Senate Judiciary Committee.
104. HOUSE BiLL 382, 79th GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS (1975), sponsored by Rep.
Hirschfeld, reads:
In any prosecution for rape under Section 11-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, ap-
proved July 28, 1961, as amended, or for assault with intent to commit, attempt to
commit, or conspiracy to commit the crime defined in such Section, opinion evi-
dence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual
conduct, or any of such evidence, is not admissible in order to prove consent by the
victim unless ruled admissible by the trial judge after an offer of proof has been
made as provided in this Section. An offer of proof of opinion evidence, reputation
evidence, and evidences of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct may be
made by the defense attorney in the case in the trial judge's chambers for the
purpose of permitting the judge to determine the relevancy and, therefore, the
admissibility of such evidence.
This Section shall not be applicable to evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with
the defendant.
This bill, although apparently intended to limit the common law admissibility of evidence
of a rape victim's promiscuity, opens the possibility for the admission of evidence long ex-
cluded at common law. Upon a finding of relevancy, the court may permit the introduction
not only of "opinion evidence [and] reputation evidence," but "evidences of specific
instances of the victim's sexual conduct" as well. [emphasis added] Id.
105. Such determination must be made out of the presence of the jury. Id.
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The second bill, House Bill 274,106 is a product of the Rape Study
Committee of the Illinois House of Representatives. 7 The bill abso-
lutely prohibits the introduction of all evidence of the prosecutrix'
previous sexual conduct with other than the accused.
Both Illinois bills leave intact the present admissibility of evi-
dence of the prosecutrix' previous sexual relations with the accused.
They do not adopt the position of the Michigan law which requires
some finding that the probative value of such evidence outweighs
its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. This approach, much like
the common law rule, fails to balance the crucial effects of this
evidence.
There are two significant differences between the two proposals.
House Bill 382 will permit the introduction of all evidence of the
prosecutrix' bad character for chastity merely upon a finding of
relevancy by the trial judge.' Such a rule, without an explicit legis-
lated balancing requirement, does not adequately address the con-
cerns raised about the common law standard. Trial judges, condi-
tioned by years of the automatic admissibility of such evidence, will
likely have little question that such evidence is "relevant" and will
accord it admission.' 09 Secondly, the very nature of the required
finding merely propagates the common law's failure to consider
both the probative value and the prejudicial side effects of such
admission. House Bill 382 provides only that the trial judge deter-
mine the evidence to be relevant. It does not require a finding that
the proposed evidence is of significant probative value or that the
106. House Bill 274, 79th GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS (1975), sponsored by Reps.
Jaffe, Peters, E.M. Barnes, Geo-Karis, McAuliffe, and Schneider, reads:
Section 115-7 is added to the "Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963", approved
August 14, 1963, as amended, the added Section to read as follows:
(Ch. 38, new par. 115-7)
Sec. 115-7 Past Sexual Conduct as Evidence in Trials of Rape. No record,
whether written, oral, or otherwise, regarding the past sexual conduct of a rape
victim, shall become admissible as evidence in a criminal proceeding against a
defendant charged with rape, except such records as concern the past sexual con-
duct of the victim with the accused.
This bill is too sparingly drafted. It makes no mention, for instance, of trials for attempted
rape. There is one additional concern: the use of the term "record" may, since it carries
connotations of some formality, cause confusion or less than blanket application of the stat-
ute.
107. The Rape Study Committee was formed by House Resolution 355, 78th GENERAL
AssEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS (1973), to study and formulate proposals for reform of Illinois
rape law.
108. The full text of the bill is set forth in note 95 supra.
109. Common law precedent, of course, will uniformly hold such evidence relevant. Simi-
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probative value outweighs the prejudicial side effects of the intro-
duction. In this respect, House Bill 382 simply vests additional dis-
cretion in the trial judge. While this may be a step towards a ra-
tional policy, it offers minimal guidance as to the requirements of
the finding, nor does it establish a considered weighing of the factors
involved or any significant presumption against the admissibility of
the evidence.
Additionally, House Bill 382 establishes this frail protection only
if the evidence is offered "to prove consent by the victim." A narrow
construction of this language might well permit the automatic ad-
missibility of such evidence if offered, not to "prove consent," but
to impeach the prosecutrix' allegations of nonconsent. 10
House Bill 274, on the other hand, absolutely prohibits introduc-
tion of evidence concerning the prosecutrix' sexual activity with
other than the accused."' This prohibition is in keeping with the
establishment of a rational policy and with the tenor of the legisla-
tive changes in Michigan and California.
While House Bill 274 substantially satisfies the concerns ad-
dressed in this article, it fails to require a trial court finding that
evidence of the prosecutrix' previous sexual conduct with the ac-
cused is more probative than prejudicial. While such a finding
would almost always be made, the inclusion of such a required
balancing would take Illinois one step further toward the adoption
of a comprehensive rational rule of evidence in rape trials. The
following draft statute contains such a provision and clarifies other
aspects of the proposed change.
Evidence of Past Sexual Conduct in Trials for Rape.
In any criminal proceeding for rape under Section 11-1 of the Crim-
inal Code of 1961, approved July 28, 1961, as amended, or for
assault with intent to commit, or conspiracy to commit the crime
defined in such Section:
(1) No evidence of specific instances of the complaining wit-
ness' sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the complaining witness'
sexual conduct, or reputation evidence of the complaining witness'
larly, FED. R. EVID. 401 establishes only a minimum standard of relevancy. Evidence is
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
110. This may be an excessively technical criticism. However, the bill is directed to the
reconstruction of long-accepted procedure, and the judiciary may be hesitant to expand its
scope further than necessary. Statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed. See, e.g., Summers v. Summers, 40 Ill. 2d 338, 239 N.E.2d 795 (1968). The legisla-
ture, therefore, must make perfectly clear the sweeping nature of the change proposed.
111. The full text of the bill is set forth in note 106 supra.
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sexual conduct shall be admitted, except as provided in paragraph
2 of this Section.
(2) Evidence of the complaining witness' past sexual conduct
with the accused or evidence of specific instances of sexual activity
showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, may
be admitted only to the extent that the judge finds that such
proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that
its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its proba-
tive value. Such a finding shall be made by the judge only upon a
written motion and offer of proof filed by the defendant. The court
may order an in camera hearing to assist in its determination.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The law, in order to maintain its meaning and viability, must
necessarily be subject to periodic review and reevaluation. Old prin-
ciples of law based on societal conditions and assumptions no longer
relevant to modem society must be reexamined and, if no longer
viable, discarded or revised.
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists for blind imitation of the past. "2
The rule of evidence holding admissible in a rape case evidence
of the prosecutrix' character for chastity is one such rule. Change is
necessary in order to ensure a more rational conduct of such trials
and the progress of our criminal justice system.
JAMES J. WESOLOWSKI
112. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAuv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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